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Abstract 
While issues that prompt corporate governance responses are endemic to the corporate form, 
the term “corporate governance” only began to feature with any regularity in discussions of 
public companies in Britain as the 1990s got underway.  It is well known that work done by 
the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, known as the Cadbury 
Committee, played a major role in fostering the rise of corporate governance in the U.K. at 
that point.  This paper explains why corporate governance did not move into the spotlight in 
Britain in the 1970s, a development that might have been anticipated given that corporate 
governance was arriving on the scene in the United States then.  The paper also identifies 
trends that likely would have ensured that corporate governance would have risen to 
prominence in Britain in the early 1990s in the absence of the Cadbury Committee’s 
deliberations.   
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Introduction 
This paper addresses in the British context the timing of and the causes underlying the 
rise of corporate governance, which encompasses the checks and balances affecting those 
who run companies.
1
  The topic of corporate governance is currently a core feature of the 
landscape in which publicly traded U.K. companies operate.  One might correspondingly 
expect that the term “corporate governance” would always have been a feature of debates in 
Britain on such firms.  Issues that prompt corporate governance responses are indeed endemic 
to the corporate form,
2
 particularly in a publicly traded company.  So long as this sort of firm 
lacks a dominant shareholder – the typical situation in large British public companies for 
decades
3
 -- there is unlikely to be any one investor who has the wherewithal to keep 
management in line.  Hence, if one assumes in the same fashion as the 2009 Walker Report 
on the corporate governance of banks that “(t)he role of corporate governance is to protect 
and advance the interests of shareholders,”4 in U.K. public companies managerial “agency 
costs” generated by inattentive or self-serving executives unconstrained by shareholders stand 
out as the major potential governance risk.
5
    
                                                          
1
  Robert E. Wright, Corporation Nation (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014), 152. 
2
  Brian R. Cheffins, ‘The History of Corporate Governance’, in Mike Wright, Donald 
Siegel, Kevin Keasey and Igor Filatotchev (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Corporate 
Governance (OUP 2013), 46, 46.  See also Klaus J. Hopt, ‘New Ways in Corporate 
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150 years.’)   
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4
  David Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial 
Industry Entities:  Final Recommendations (Walker Review Secretariat, 2009), 23.  On 
“shareholder/stakeholder” governance problems see Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Introduction’ in 
Brian R. Cheffins, ed., The History of Modern U.S. Corporate Governance (Edward Elgar, 
2011), ix, x.   
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  Brian Cheffins and Steven Bank, ‘Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?’ (2009) 83 Bus 
Hist Rev 443, 443-44.  The pioneering work on managerial agency costs was Michael C. 
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Concerns have been expressed in the U.K. since at least the late 18
th
 century that large 
business enterprises are afflicted by managerial accountability shortcomings and shareholder 
apathy.
6
  Nevertheless, in Britain the concept of corporate governance only explicitly became 
an integral feature of the public company landscape at the beginning of the 1990s.  A 1992 
report and Code of Best Practice issued by Sir Adrian Cadbury and the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance he chaired stand out as the most obvious 
explanation why “corporate governance” rose to prominence at that point in time.7   
The history of the Cadbury Committee has been canvassed in detail.
8
  Nevertheless, 
more remains to be said about the rise of corporate governance in the U.K.  This paper does 
so in two ways.  First, it explains why corporate governance did not achieve prominence in 
the U.K. in the 1970s despite this occurring in the United States.  Second, the paper argues 
that corporate governance would in all likelihood have become topical in Britain in the early 
1990s in the absence of the Cadbury Committee, identifying in so doing trends that would 
have led to this outcome.   
The chronology of corporate governance means that the U.S. experience features 
prominently in the account offered here of the rise of corporate governance in Britain.  Part of 
the reason is that the U.S. was a “first mover.”  The term “corporate governance” was used 
initially with regularity in the U.S. in the 1970s; the terminology only came into general 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 J Fin Econ 305. 
6
  Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Ownership and Control:  British Business Transformed 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.   
7
  Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Report, (Gee, 1992) 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Code of Best Practice (Gee, 
1992). 
8
  Laura F. Spira and Judy Slinn, The Cadbury Committee:  A History (OUP, 2012). 
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usage elsewhere a couple of decades later.
9
  Also important is that trends which in the U.S. 
sustained corporate governance in the 1980s as a topic for debate and set the scene for 
corporate governance to become entrenched as a key feature of the public company landscape 
in the 1990s were also present in the U.K.  It is these trends that explain why even in the 
absence of Cadbury corporate governance likely was destined to become a prominent issue in 
Britain as the 1990s got underway.     
The paper begins by describing the arrival of corporate governance in the 1970s in the 
United States.  The scene then switches to Britain, with the focus being on explaining why 
corporate governance failed to catch on in this era in Britain in the same way it did in the 
U.S.  Evidence will then be provided on how the concept of corporate governance initially 
achieved prominence in Britain as the 1990s got underway and the major contribution the 
Cadbury Committee made on this front will be acknowledged.  Next, there will be discussion 
of trends concerning publicly traded companies and their executives that were present in both 
the U.S. and the U.K. as the 20
th
 century drew to a close that left Britain primed for corporate 
governance to move to the forefront even absent the work of the Cadbury Committee.  Global 
developments occurring in the 1990s are taken into account briefly to conclude the paper.   
The United States as a Corporate Governance “First Mover”10    
The United States experienced during the opening decades of the 20
th
 century what 
distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler would characterize as a “managerial 
                                                          
9
  Cheffins (n 2) 47, 56-58.   
10
  The sections of this paper that deal with the U.S. draw heavily on other research of 
mine.  See Cheffins (n 2); Cheffins (n 4); Brian R. Cheffins, ‘The Corporate Governance 
Movement, Banks and the Financial Crisis’ (2015) 16 Theo Inquiries in Law 1.  For full 
citations supporting the propositions advanced here concerning the U.S., please refer to these 
sources.   
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revolution”.11  A growing division between share ownership and managerial control and the 
development of increasingly sophisticated managerial hierarchies were hallmarks of this 
transition.  By the 1950s and 1960s, “managerial capitalism had triumphed”,12 with 
enterprises with full-time professional executives fully in charge dominating pivotal sectors 
of the U.S. economy. 
When World War II ended, the U.S. experienced a prolonged economic boom, 
successful corporations grew rapidly and, as an incidental by-product, shares in public 
companies performed well.  Moreover, scandals, while not unknown, were the exception to 
the rule as senior executives of U.S. public companies refrained for the most part from taking 
personal advantage of their position as stewards of corporate assets.  Correspondingly, during 
the “heyday of…corporate managerialism”13 the internal governance of companies was not a 
high priority and the phrase “corporate governance” was rarely uttered.   
Matters began to change in the 1970s.  Sprawling corporate empires built or expanded 
in the 1950s and the 1960s proved difficult to run, a trend underscored by the 1970 collapse 
of Penn Central, a railway-based conglomerate.  Corruption emerged shortly thereafter as a 
cause for concern amidst revelations that dozens of U.S. public corporations had engaged in 
bribery and related misconduct, both at home and abroad.  The federal Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) responded to the Penn Central debacle and the illicit payment revelations 
by bringing corporate governance explicitly on to the official agenda.  In addition to holding 
hearings in 1977 on corporate governance and shareholder democracy the SEC launched 
                                                          
11
  Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand:  The Managerial Revolution in American 
Business (Belknap Press, 1977) 484. 
12
  Alfred D. Chandler, ‘The United States:  Seedbed of Managerial Capitalism’ in Alfred 
D. Chandler and Herman Daems (eds) Managerial Hierarchies:  Comparative Perspectives 
on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise (Harvard University Press, 1980) 9, 35. 
13
  Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-
2005:  Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices’ (2007) 59 Stanford L Rev 1465, 1511.   
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proceedings against three of Penn Central’s outside directors, settled numerous cases 
involving allegations of corporate corruption by accepting undertakings from the companies 
involved to create a board level audit committee and appoint additional “outside” (non-
executive) directors and “bullied”14 the New York Stock Exchange into requiring listed 
companies to have audit committees composed of independent directors.     
A 1980 SEC staff report based on the 1977 corporate governance hearings refrained 
from recommending legal reform concerning board structure or related issues.
15
  Two bills, 
however, were introduced to Congress in 1980 that proposed mandating a major governance 
role for independent directors as part of an effort to prompt corporations to function in more 
democratic and accountable ways.
16
  Interest in corporate governance also grew outside 
Washington DC, especially in the legal community.  Ralph Nader, Mark Green and Joel 
Seligman, each graduates of Harvard Law School,
17
 published in 1976 Taming the Giant 
Corporation, which offered the earliest available detailed theorization of the term “corporate 
governance” and advocated imposing on directors a wide range of oversight responsibilities 
as well as recommending that local communities be given the opportunity to vote on 
corporate activities that could create health hazards.
18
  The American Law Institute (ALI), 
which undertakes projects to clarify and modernize areas of the law, committed itself in 
principle in 1978 to address corporate governance and followed up by organizing in 1980 a 
                                                          
14
  ‘The Securities and Exchange Commission’ Economist (London 9 Oct 1976) 80.   
15
  Securities and Exchange Commission, Staff Report on Corporate Accountability (U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1980), 34. 
16
  Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act, S. 2567, 96th Congress, 2d Sess., 126 
Congressional Record S3754; Corporate Democracy Act of 1980, HR 7010, 96
th
 Congress, 
2d Sess. 
17
  Robert M. Smith, ‘Nader Group Urges the Federal Chartering of Big Corporations’ 
New York Times (New York, 25 January 1976) 28.  Seligman went on to become a law 
professor.   
18
  Ralph Nader, Mark Green and Joel Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (WW 
Norton & Co, 1976). 
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conference on the topic co-sponsored by the American Bar Association and the New York 
Stock Exchange.  Media coverage accelerated accordingly.
19
 
Corporate Governance Bypasses Britain (Temporarily) 
Hugo Young, a prominent U.K. political commentator, said of “governance” in a 
review of a 1976 book by the prominent Labour politician Harold Wilson entitled The 
Governance of Britain that “it is a word devoid of modern meaning or use,” had a 
“Chaucerian ring” and a “14th century…heyday”.20  Young, in making these observations, 
presumably (and understandably) was unaware that the term “corporate governance” was 
gaining a foothold across the Atlantic as a focal point for concerns about managerial 
accountability.  On the other hand, Barry Barker, secretary and chief executive of the U.K. 
Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), acknowledged a few years later 
both the antiquarian origins of the term “governance” and the recent emergence of the term in 
the U.S. corporate context, saying   
“Governance is a Middle English word which the Americans have brought back to us 
in the expressive phrase ‘corporate governance’ – the purposes and method of how we 
structure and control our companies large and small.”21 
                                                          
19
  According to the ProQuest Historical Newspaper database the number of times the 
phrase “corporate governance” was mentioned in major U.S. newspapers (Baltimore Sun, 
Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, New York 
Times, Philadelphia Tribune, Pittsburgh Courier, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post) 
was zero in 1970 and 1971, one in 1972, zero in 1973, 1974 and 1975, one in 1976, 16 in 
1977 and 41 in 1978.   
20
  Hugo Young ‘The Lessons of a Prime Minister’ Sunday Times (London, 24 October 
1976) 41, reviewing Harold Wilson, The Governance of Britain (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1976).  See also Donald Brydon, ‘More Dialogue Between Boards and Shareholders is 
Needed’ Independent (London, 11 February 1991) 11 (“When Harold Wilson wrote his 
memoirs The Governance of Britain many of us had to check the meaning of the archaic 
word ‘governance’.”)   
21
  Barry Barker, ‘Foreword’ in Kenneth Midgley (ed), Management Accountability and 
Corporate Governance (Macmillan, 1982), vii (foreword dated August 1980). 
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Barker made his observations concerning the lineage of the term “corporate 
governance” in the foreword to a 1982 book publishing papers presented at the ICSA’s 1979 
annual conference under the theme “Corporate Governance and Accountability”.22  The 1979 
conference and 1982 volume conceivably could have been part of a surge in interest in 
corporate governance in Britain similar to that the United States had been experiencing.  This 
was not the case.   
Robert Tricker, in a 1984 book focusing on the U.K. entitled Corporate Governance 
observed “Scant attention has been paid to governance in the British company.”23  The fact 
that up to 1985 the term “corporate governance” had only ever been mentioned in the Times 
newspaper in a single 1978 article bore out Tricker’s observation.24  While Sir Adrian 
Cadbury subsequently said he “regarded Bob Tricker as the father of corporate governance 
since his 1984 book introduced me to the words corporate governance”25 the book did not 
change the situation markedly.  The phrase “corporate governance” was not used at all in the 
Guardian, the Economist and the Observer until 1989, 1990 and 1991 respectively.
26
   
Even the Financial Times, which offers the most thorough U.K. newspaper coverage 
of British and international business, largely ignored corporate governance in the 1980s.  The 
term first appeared in that paper in a May 1978 article on the growing prominence of outside 
                                                          
22
  ibid. 
23
  R.I. Tricker, Corporate Governance (Gower 1984), 9.  
24
  Cheffins (n 2) 57.     
25
  Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance:  Principles, Policies, and Practices, 3
rd
 ed. 
(OUP, 2015), book cover “blurb”.    
26
  Cheffins (n 2) 57 (Economist); Mary Brasier, ‘US-Style Proxy War Looks Set to 
Spread to British Companies’, Guardian (London, 22 June 1989) 15; Maurice Gillibrand, 
‘Accountability is the Key to Wider Share Ownership’ Observer (London, 19 May 1991) 30 
(search conducted using the ProQuest Historical Newspaper database).  
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directors in U.S. public companies.
27
  “Corporate governance” was then only mentioned 18 
times in the 1980s, less than half as often as in 1990 alone (Figure 1). 
Figure 1:  “Corporate Governance” “hits”, Financial Times, 1970-1990  
 
Source:  Gale Cengage Financial Times Historical Archive 
Why Was Scant Attention Paid to Corporate Governance in the U.K. Prior to the 1990s? 
Britain and the United States obviously differ in many ways.  In contrast, however, 
with most other countries they share an “outsider/arm’s-length” system of ownership and 
control where larger public companies typically lack a “core” shareholder capable of 
exercising “inside” influence.28  Correspondingly, in both Britain and the U.S. managerial 
“agency costs” generated by inattentive or self-serving executives unconstrained by apathetic 
                                                          
27
  Stewart Fleming, ‘The Outsiders Who Are Taking Over American Boardrooms’ 
Financial Times (London, 15 May 1978) 11 (search conducted using Gale Cengage Financial 
Times Historical Archive). 
28
  Cheffins (n 6) 5.  On other similarities relevant to corporate governance, see Bonnie 
G. Buchanan et al., ‘Shareholder Proposal Rules and Practice:  Evidence from a Comparison 
of the United States and United Kingdom’ (2012) 49 Amer Bus LJ 739, 751. 
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shareholders constitute the major potential governance risk whereas elsewhere the core 
corporate governance concern is that dominant shareholders will exploit outside investors.
29
   
Why, despite having similar corporate governance priorities, did Britain fail to 
experience until the early 1990s the sort of surge in interest in corporate governance the U.S. 
experienced in the 1970s?  A total lack of awareness that corporate governance was an issue 
in the U.S. was not the reason.  As we have seen, ICSA organized a corporate governance-
themed conference in 1979 and the term was mentioned occasionally in the British media as 
the 1970s drew to a close.
30
  Why, then, did corporate governance come to prominence in 
Britain nearly two decades later than it did in the U.S? 
Share ownership patterns 
A difference in chronology with the systems of ownership and control prevailing in 
the U.S. and the U.K. is a plausible but ultimately unconvincing explanation for corporate 
governance belatedly attracting attention in Britain.  In the U.S. it was generally assumed by 
the 1950s that it was the norm for large public companies to lack dominant shareholders.
31
  
Some have argued, in contrast, that in Britain sizeable family blockholders were prevalent 
until the mid-1980s.
32
  Given that the nature of ownership and control within a particular 
country does much to shape the governance issues at stake, conceivably 1970s debates about 
corporate governance in the U.S. were not directly relevant to Britain.   
It in fact seems unlikely that differing patterns of ownership and control account for 
corporate governance’s somewhat belated popularity in Britain.  U.S.-style diffuse share 
                                                          
29
  Cheffins (n 4) x; Cheffins (n 6) 1-3, 5;  
30
  Text to nn 21-22.   
31
  Cheffins and Bank (n 5) 455-56.  
32
  See, for example, Mark J. Roe, ‘Political Foundations for Separating Ownership from 
Control’ in Joseph A. McCahery et al. (eds) Corporate Governance Regimes:  Convergence 
and Diversity (OUP, 2002), 113, 129.    
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ownership was the norm in Britain by the 1970s
33
 and perhaps considerably earlier.
34
  
Correspondingly, differing patterns of ownership and control fail to explain why corporate 
governance became topical in the U.S. in the 1970s and failed to do so at that point in Britain.      
Differences in share ownership regarding institutional shareholders might indeed have 
been expected to make Britain more fertile ground for corporate governance debate than the 
U.S. in the 1970s.  In the U.K., as was the case in the U.S., retail investors ill-suited to 
intervene in the affairs of companies in which they owned shares traditionally dominated 
share registers.
35
  In both countries institutional investors theoretically better positioned to 
have an impact would move to the forefront in the second half of the 20
th
 century but this 
happened considerably earlier in Britain.  The proportion of shares retail investors owned 
collectively fell below half in the late 1960s in Britain but not until the 1990s in the U.S.
36
   
During the 1960s and 1970s numerous observers in the U.K. flagged up the potential 
for institutional shareholder intervention in public companies.
37
  If institutional shareholders 
had followed up, the term “corporate governance” plausibly could have been borrowed from 
the U.S. to describe the contribution shareholder activism was making to managerial 
accountability.  During the 1970s, however, institutional investors were “the sleeping giants 
                                                          
33
  Cheffins (n 6) 11-17, 303-7.   
34
  James Foreman-Peck and Leslie Hannah, ‘Extreme Divorce:  the Managerial 
Revolution in UK Companies before 1914’ (2011) 65 Econ Hist Rev 1217 (saying most 
publicly traded companies lacked a dominant shareholder as far back as the early 20
th
 
century). 
35
  Cheffins (n 4) xix; Cheffins, (n 6) 126. 
36
  John Armour and David A. Skeel, ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why:  The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation’ (2007) 95 Geo. LJ 
1727, 1767-69.  
37
  Cheffins (n 6) 372.   
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of British corporate life,”38 meaning they would not be catalysts for the early arrival of the 
concept of corporate governance in the U.K. 
Market forces 
While share ownership patterns do little to explain why the concept of corporate 
governance failed to gain a foothold in Britain before the 1990s, a perception that market 
forces were doing an adequate job of fostering managerial accountability may well have 
played a role.  Insurance company associations, when providing evidence in 1977 to a 
committee chaired by Harold Wilson that was tasked with reviewing the functioning of 
financial institutions, argued shareholder intervention in the affairs of public companies 
would be superfluous by saying “(t)o a large degree reliance can be placed on the essentially 
competitive nature of the private enterprise system which imposes strong pressures and 
incentives on management, and the capital markets can play their part in this.”39  The 
reference to capital markets encompassed the scrutiny to which public offerings of shares are 
subject as well as takeovers, of which the insurance company associations said:   
“Poor management tends to lead to lower share prices, less ability to raise cash and 
more vulnerability to acquisition by successful competitors.   For many years now 
industrial managements have shown themselves to be sensitive to the message of their 
relative ratings in the stock market.  Far more managements of public companies have 
taken this message and put their houses in order than have ever been taken over….”40 
As the insurance company associations suggested, takeover activity can theoretically 
have a disciplinary effect on management, and, crucially for present purposes, can do so in a 
                                                          
38
  David Kynaston, The City of London, vol. IV:  A Club No More, 1945-2000 (Pimlico, 
2001), 373. 
39
  Committee to Review the Functioning of Financial Institutions (Chairman, Sir Harold 
Wilson), Evidence on the Financing of Trade and Industry, vol. 3 (HMSO, 1977), 91.   
40
  ibid 71.   
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way that can marginalize corporate governance as a topic for discussion.  Executives who are 
fearful of being dismissed as a result of a takeover offer where the bidder acquires control at 
an opportunistic price have a meaningful incentive to run their companies in a way that keeps 
the share price sufficiently high to deter unwelcome approaches.
41
  Correspondingly, 
takeovers, as with “internal” corporate governance mechanisms such as monitoring by 
boards, shareholder activism and incentivized executive pay, can induce management to 
focus on shareholders’ interests.42  Arguably, then, as the insurance company associations 
implied, takeover activity side-lined debates on corporate governance in the U.K. by 
rendering internal governance mechanisms superfluous.   
Merger and acquisition (M&A) activity was in a lull in the U.K. in the late 1970s.
43
  
The 1980s, in contrast, were marked by hectic merger activity,
44
 so to the extent that 
takeovers render corporate governance moot it was more likely to happen then.  Various 
observers indeed remarked upon the disciplinary impact of takeovers during this era.  The 
business editor of the Sunday Times said for instance in 1986 “The decision of the market is 
usually the best, if not the only, means of putting industrial assets into the hands of those 
most able to manage them.”45  The Financial Times similarly argued that “(a)n active market 
                                                          
41
  Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law:  Theory, Structure and Operation (OUP, 1997), 
119. 
42
  Klaus J. Hopt, ‘Comparative Corporate Governance:  The State of the Art and 
International Regulation’ in Andreas M. Fleckner and Klaus J. Hopt (eds), Comparative 
Corporate Governance:  A Functional and International Analysis (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 3, 11-12; Philip Stiles, ‘Corporate Governance’ in Patrick C. Flood and Yseult 
Freeney (eds), Wiley Encyclopedia of Management:  vol. 11 -- Organizational Behavior 
(Wiley, 2014), 84.      
43
  For data see Brian Chiplin and Mike Wright, The Logic of Mergers:  The Competitive 
Market in Corporate Control in Theory and Practice (Institute of Economic Affairs, 1987), 
12-18. 
44
  ibid. 
45
  John Jay, ‘Long Live Bid Mania’ Sunday Times (London, 27 July 1986) 54.    
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in corporate control is healthy”46 with the caveat “Britain is too dependent on takeovers as a 
remedy for poor industrial management.”47  Lord Hanson and Owen Green, who ran 
companies (Hanson and BTR respectively) that sought to create value by acquiring poorly 
run companies and improving shareholder returns by selling superfluous assets and imposing 
tough fiscal discipline, were voted the top industrialists in Britain in 1989 by their peers
48
 and 
hailed by the press as “heroes”49 and “superstars.”50  
Features of 1970s U.S. debates concerning corporate governance were absent in Britain 
While the robust nature of Britain’s market for corporate control in the 1980s likely 
helps to explain why the topic of corporate governance attracted little attention in that decade, 
why absent hectic deal-making in the latter half of the 1970s did the corporate governance 
debates occurring in the U.S. fail to resonate in Britain?  The U.K. had, after all, a corporate 
collapse akin to Penn Central’s.  In 1971, Rolls Royce, the U.K.’s fourth largest employer 
and a synonym for British industrial quality and pride, went bankrupt, resulting in Britain’s 
biggest bankruptcy proceeding in decades and “causing shock waves here like the Penn 
Central did in the U.S.”51  Also, as was the case with Penn Central, managerial 
accountability, or lack thereof, played a role in Rolls Royce’s collapse, as there were “clear 
                                                          
46
  ‘Questioning Hostile Bids’ Financial Times (London, 9 November 1988) 28.  
47
  ‘Confronting City Failures’ Financial Times (London, 30 January 1987) 18.  See also 
Tim Jenkinson and Colin Mayer, ‘The Assessment:  Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control’ (1992) 8(3) Oxf Rev Econ Policy 1, 3 (identifying problematic features of takeovers 
while saying “takeovers are the most widely discussed form of corporate governance in the 
UK….”) 
48
  Philip Beresford, ‘Hanson and Green Rated Tops by Their Peers’ Sunday Times 
(London, 5 November 1989) D20.   
49
  ‘The Industrial Heroes’ Sunday Times (London, 29 March 1987) 69; Mike Smith, 
‘Still Room at the Top for Heroes’ Financial Times (London, 23 December 1987) 13.   
50
  Peter Rogers, Margareta Pagano and Hamish McRae, ‘How the Superstars Won City 
Support’ Guardian (London, 22 January 1985) 21.    
51
  Felin Kessler, ‘Anatomy of a Fall’ Financial Times (London, 8 February 1971) 1.  
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danger signals which never got through to the main board” amidst “trappings of pride, 
arrogance, misjudgement and blind optimism.”52   
Britain, on the other hand, lacked the sort of commotion over illicit payments by 
companies that existed in the U.S.  This was not necessarily because British companies had 
markedly higher ethical standards than their American counterparts.  There indeed were 
allegations that during the 1970s British arms companies were regularly paying sizeable illicit 
“commissions” to obtain contracts in developing countries and two executives of the Racal 
electronics group were convicted for taking and paying bribes in relation to tank radios 
destined for Iran.
53
  The nature of securities regulation, however, meant the corruption in U.S. 
companies would have governance ramifications in a way that illicit practices in which U.K. 
companies might have engaged would not.   
One difference was the law governing disclosure by public companies.  Federal 
securities regulation in place in the U.S. placed companies which had made illicit payments 
under an onus to disclose the practices in a way U.K. companies legislation did not, 
prompting some to argue that the law should be amended in Britain.
54
  Moreover, the U.K. 
lacked an equivalent to the SEC,
55
 which proved adept at maximizing the leverage the 
disclosure rules provided to put corporate governance in the spotlight.   
The SEC got the ball rolling in the U.S. by launching a handful of civil cases against 
public companies where there was independent evidence of illicit payments, alleging that the 
                                                          
52
  Peter Wilsher, ‘Where Was Whitehall When Rolls’ Light Went Out?” Sunday Times 
(London, 5 August 1973) 50.  See also Peter Rodgers, ‘Rolls Chiefs’ Angry Replies’ 
Guardian (London, 3 Aug 1973) 1.    
53
  ‘It’s Official’ Economist (London, 12 Nov 1977) 78; ‘Where Bribery is an Accepted 
Way of Life’ Guardian (London, 22 Jan 1978) 3.    
54
  ‘Bribes:  The Next Step’ Sunday Times (London, 22 May 1977) 16.   
55
  ‘Who is Business’ Keeper?’ Economist (London, 23 Dec 1972), 56; Alexander 
Johnston, ‘The City Can Look After Itself’ Sunday Times (London, 6 May 1973), 63.    
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corruption resulted in falsification of financial statements.
56
  Having signalled its intent in this 
way, the SEC established a voluntary disclosure program under which companies could 
report questionable payments without providing details on the recipients.
57
  Approximately 
350 companies came forward,
58
 and the way that the SEC got a large number of prominent 
firms to own up commanded respect and enhanced its reputation as a regulator.
59
  The stage 
correspondingly was set effectively for the SEC to bring corporate governance on to the 
official agenda by orchestrating board-related settlements with firms admitting to 
questionable payments, by holding the 1977 hearings on corporate governance and by having 
chairman Harold Williams speak widely on the need for improvements on the governance 
front.
60
  
The industrial democracy distraction 
While the nature of securities regulation likely helps to explain why corporate 
governance did not come on to the agenda in Britain in the 1970s in the same way it did in 
the U.S., the nature of discourse concerning the board structure of large companies was also 
important.  In the early 1970s, with interest in the concept of corporate governance poised to 
take off in the U.S., there was in the U.K. high-level debate on governance-related issues 
without explicit reference to corporate governance.  Sir Brandon Rhys Williams introduced 
private member bills in multiple sessions of Parliament that would, if enacted, have required 
larger public companies to have at least three non-executive directors on the board.
61
  These 
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measures had no chance of becoming law
62
 but the Conservative government of the time was 
not entirely unsympathetic.  It indicated that the way forward was to have matters considered 
in proper context by a committee the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) established in 
1972 to investigate means for improving the accountability of management.
63
  The 
Watkinson Committee (the committee was chaired by Cadbury Schweppes chairman Lord 
Watkinson) reported in 1973, with the centrepiece of its report being a 12 item non-binding 
Code of Corporate Conduct that acknowledged that larger public companies should have non-
executive directors on the board charged with monitoring the executives.
64
  Government 
White Papers issued in 1973 and 1977 similarly accepted that non-executive directors could 
beneficially increase the element of independence and objectivity in the boardroom but 
refrained from recommending that their appointment be mandatory.
65
   
It might have been thought that with non-executives being a topic for debate in the 
U.K. in the 1970s the term “corporate governance” would have travelled across the Atlantic 
to Britain as a handy catch phrase.  However, during this period a topic peripheral to the 
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initial surge of interest in corporate governance in the U.S. monopolized attention in Britain.  
This was industrial democracy.
66
  
A Christian Science Monitor columnist observed in 1977, “In many countries of 
Europe, but distinctly not the United States, workers are demanding, and getting, a larger 
voice in the decisionmaking process that makes their company run.”67  As the 1970s began, 
Britain was not one of those European countries.  Employee involvement in corporate 
decision-making had barely registered as an issue in the U.K. as the 1970s got underway.
68
  
However, in 1973 Labour leader Harold Wilson said “we are at the beginning of a social 
revolution in this sphere.”69  Britain’s joining the European Union, then known as the 
European Economic Community (EEC), was a catalyst.   
In the late 1960s the EEC began to promulgate measures designed to harmonize 
company law in all of its Member States.
 70
  Britain, when it joined the EEC in 1973, became 
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obliged to implement those measures in force.  In 1972 the European Commission issued a 
draft Fifth Directive which, if adopted, would have required Member States to promulgate 
mandatory rules regarding the internal structure and decision-making processes of public 
limited companies, including the organization of the board.
71
  The 1972 draft was structured 
to require companies affected to have a two-tier board where a managing organ made up of 
executive directors would run the company while being monitored by a supervisory organ 
made up of non-executive directors, including representatives of the employees.
72
   
The board structure contemplated by the draft Fifth Directive was radically different 
from that which was standard in Britain.  The board in U.K. public companies of the early 
1970s was a unitary rather than two-tier body, there was no tradition of employee directors, a 
substantial minority of large companies did not have a single non-executive director and in 
those companies with non-executives these directors typically found themselves in a minority 
of one-quarter to one-third.
73
  Correspondingly, possible implementation of the Fifth 
Directive was for many in Britain an alarming prospect that quickly dominated analysis of 
board structure,
74
 likely leaving in the process little room for discussions of corporate 
governance occurring in the U.S. to influence debate.   
A 1974 Financial Times report on British boards said ‘Probably no single issue has 
caused more worry than the prospect of being obliged to conform to the German or Dutch 
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model of a two-tier board….”75  As radical as the Fifth Directive might have been for British 
businesses if the EEC had adopted it (the EEC never did),
76
 it would soon be overshadowed 
by a homebred worker-director initiative that further marginalized from a British perspective 
fledgling discussions of corporate governance in the U.S.  The distraction was 
understandable.  Distinguished company law academic Dan Prentice argued in 1978 that the 
proposals on the agenda to provide for employee representation in the boardroom would, if 
implemented fully, “transform the prevailing legal relationship between shareholders and the 
board, and between the board and corporate management.”77  The proposals, moreover, were 
sufficiently high on the policy agenda to “enrage” 78 the British business community and to 
prompt newspaper speculation about a “new industrial revolution”79 and a “jolt to class 
balance.”80  
A 1977 report by the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy, chaired by 
Lord Bullock, became the focal point for debate on employee representation on boards in 
Britain.
81
  The Labour government, which had committed itself in its October 1974 election 
manifesto to a radical extension of industrial democracy in the private sector,
82
 announced in 
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1975 a commitment to legislating in this area and established the Bullock Committee to 
prepare the ground.
83
  The Financial Times said as the Bullock Committee was deliberating 
that worker directors were “on the way – sooner or later”.84  The majority report of the 
Bullock Committee recommended that with companies with a staff of 2,000 or more the 
employees should, on application by a recognized trade union, have the opportunity to vote 
whether to introduce, by way of a combination of union nominees and “co-opted” directors 
(directors agreed upon by the union and the shareholders) equal rights of representation on 
the board with shareholders.
85
   
Lord Bullock maintained at the time the Bullock Report was issued “We are at the 
beginning of a change which will sweep to all countries of Europe”86 and the Secretary of 
State for Trade reaffirmed the government’s commitment to extending industrial democracy 
radically.
87
  Barron’s, the U.S. business newspaper, said there at least would be a 
compromise between management and unions “with both sides shaking hands over the 
mangled corpse of the shareholder.”88  In the face, however, of strong opposition from the 
business community and a lack of consensus among trade unionists enthusiasm for industrial 
democracy waned among senior government figures.
89
  Proposals set out in a 1978 White 
Paper correspondingly were considerably diluted as compared to the majority Bullock 
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report.
90
  The Labour government, struggling to cope with events that culminated in a 1978-
79 “winter of discontent” and electoral defeat in 1979, did not table legislation to implement 
the White Paper.
91
   
The Financial Times predicted prior to the 1979 election that the issue of industrial 
democracy would not go away whatever the result.
92
  Matters worked out differently when 
Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives won convincingly, with the Labour Party abandoning 
even a rhetorical commitment to Bullock-style industrial democracy after the early 1980s.
93
  
Nevertheless, the intense debate over employee representation on boards that was occurring 
as the concept of corporate governance emerged from obscurity in the U.S. likely helps to 
explain why the same did not occur across the Atlantic.  As the Deputy Secretary of the 
Department of Trade said at a 1981 U.S. conference on corporate governance, “Corporate 
governance is not a term heard in Europe….The major item of debate for years has been 
industrial democracy.”94 
Corporate Governance Arrives in Britain 
While corporate governance was rarely mentioned in Britain for nearly two decades 
after the initial surge in interest in the concept in the United States, matters changed 
dramatically as the 1990s began.  In 1990, the year before the Cadbury Committee was 
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established, press coverage of corporate governance began in earnest (Fig. 1) and theoretical 
commentary was starting to accumulate.
95
  Readers of 1990 articles on non-executive 
directors in the Financial Times were told that “Corporate governance is one of those themes 
of the 1990s that is growing in intensity”96 and that “There is ample evidence that investors 
are concerned about the state of corporate governance in the U.K.”97  John Redwood, the 
corporate affairs minister, said the same year he supported calls by institutional shareholders 
for “truly independent” non-executive director representation on boards and added that 
“Better corporate governance does require the remodelling of some boards of directors.”98   
In 1991, an investment manager was quoted in the Independent to the effect 
“governance…would become one of the fashionable words of the 1990s”.99  The Guardian 
similarly referred in 1992 to “the current craze for corporate governance issues.”100  The 
Financial Times likewise remarked upon “the public fascination with corporate 
governance”101 and the Observer suggested that “the matter of corporate governance will be 
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the issue for public companies as we hurtle towards 2000.”102  A massive increase in media 
coverage reflected the changed circumstances (Fig. 2).   
Figure 2:  “Corporate Governance” “hits”, Financial Times & Guardian/Observer 1990-2000 
  
Source:  Gale Cengage Financial Times Historical Archive/ProQuest Historical 
Newspaper Database 
The Cadbury Committee and the Rise of Corporate Governance 
Why did corporate governance achieve prominence in Britain when it did at the start 
of the 1990s?  The work of the Cadbury Committee stands out as the most obvious catalyst 
for the newfound interest in the topic.  Cadbury’s impact indeed was substantial, as we will 
see now.  The remainder of the paper will show, however, that due to various trends relating 
to publicly traded companies the concept of corporate governance likely was destined to rise 
to prominence in Britain in the early 1990s even in the absence of Cadbury.   
The Cadbury Committee in Operation 
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The Cadbury Committee was launched in May 1991 by the London Stock Exchange, 
key members of the accountancy profession and the Financial Reporting Council, an 
independent regulator backed by accountancy organizations and the U.K. government.
103
  
The Committee’s sponsors were concerned about an erosion of confidence in the standard of 
disclosure in published company accounts and in the ability of auditors to meet the 
expectations of users of corporate financial statements.
104
  The Committee also had a mandate 
to take into account broader corporate governance issues, including the responsibilities of 
executive and non-executive directors to review and report on corporate performance and 
foster communication between the board, shareholders and other stakeholders.
105
  
Accordingly, institutional investors and the corporate sector, in the form of a council member 
of the CBI, were represented on the Committee.
106
   
The Cadbury Committee agreed quickly after its establishment that it would generate 
a code of best practice.
107
  By the time the Committee issued a report and draft code of 
corporate governance best practice in May 1992 it had settled on the idea that companies 
should publish a statement of compliance with its code as a continuing obligation of listing 
on the London Stock Exchange.
108
  In December of that year the Cadbury Committee issued 
the final version of its Code of Best Practice and an accompanying report which provided the 
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rationale for the Committee’s recommendations.109  The Stock Exchange followed up shortly 
thereafter by introducing what became known as the “comply or explain” obligation in its 
listing rules.
110
  Listed companies correspondingly became obliged either to adhere fully to 
the provisions in the Code of Best Practice or explain any non-compliance.
111
 
Critics argued that the Cadbury Code and the accompanying report offered guidance 
that was too vague and insufficiently ambitious and that improvement would be incremental 
because adherence to the guidelines was not required by law.
112
  Such pessimism proved to 
be largely unwarranted.
113
  Non-executive directors had in the wake of the issuance of the 
Cadbury Code leverage they lacked previously and listed companies treated failing to adhere 
to Code of Best Practice provisions as something to be avoided.
114
  In the foreword to a 
Cadbury Committee 1995 report on compliance with the Code, Sir Adrian Cadbury 
characterized the response as “heartening” and said “Real progress in raising governance 
standards is being made….”115  A committee chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel with a remit of 
reviewing the impact of the Cadbury Report and a 1995 report on executive pay by a 
committee chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury
116
 said in its 1998 report of Cadbury that it was 
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“generally accepted that implementation of the code’s provisions has led to higher standards 
of governance and greater awareness.”117  
The work the Cadbury Committee did was influential internationally as well as 
domestically.  While most countries with well-developed equity markets now have in place a 
widely recognized code or set of corporate governance principles and such codes are often 
backed by a “comply or explain” regime,118 the Cadbury Code was the pioneer and as such 
quickly captured attention elsewhere.  The 1998 Hampel Report said that Cadbury “struck a 
chord in many overseas countries; it has provided a yardstick against which standards of 
corporate governance in other markets are being measured.”119  A Swiss company law expert 
said the same year “it is hard to imagine today how any discussion of Corporate Governance 
could by-pass the Cadbury Report and the corresponding Code of Best Practice.”120  The 
Cadbury Code thus qualified as the 1990s drew to a close as “the world leader” with respect 
to corporate governance issues.
121
  Sir Adrian Cadbury himself “rapidly became the public 
face of corporate governance around the world, travelling widely to address conferences and 
spending time giving interviews to journalists from publications ranging from local 
newspapers to widely read practitioner journals.”122   
Why did the Cadbury Committee’s deliberations have a substantial impact? 
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Why was the Cadbury Committee so influential?  Over the long haul, the novelty and 
effectiveness of its Code of Best Practice were pivotal.  As we have just seen, dealing with 
corporate governance by way of a code backed by “comply or explain” not only was 
innovative but had a greater impact on public company behaviour than many anticipated.  In 
the short-term, events occurring concurrently with the Cadbury Committee’s establishment 
and deliberations put Cadbury – and corporate governance -- in the spotlight to an 
unanticipated degree.   
The launching of the Cadbury Committee did not in and of itself have a galvanizing 
effect.  A newspaper columnist identified the name of the committee as a major obstacle, 
saying of those in charge of naming the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance “You could not have chosen better if you wanted to kill your report stone 
dead.”123  Sir Adrian Cadbury indeed was wrong footed by the attention the Committee 
would subsequently garner, saying in September 1992 of himself and the other Committee 
members “When we were set up, we didn’t expect to be the centre of all of this attention.”124    
A recession the U.K. was experiencing was one event occurring just prior to and 
during the course of the Cadbury Committee’s deliberations that drew attention to its work.  
As Cadbury himself noted prior to the issuance of the December 1992 final report 
challenging economic conditions affecting Britain had been exposing managerial weaknesses 
the buoyant economy of the late 1980s had masked.
125
  The fact that executive pay was rising 
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substantially as profits fell due to the economic downturn reinforced the idea that not enough 
was being done to hold top executives to account in leading U.K. companies.
126
   
A wave of corporate scandals occurring contemporaneously with the Cadbury 
Committee’s formation and operation was an even more important reason Cadbury received 
unanticipated attention.  The Cadbury Report implicitly acknowledged the point in its final 
report, saying “Had a Code such as ours been in the existence in the past, we believe that a 
number of the recent examples of unexpected company failures and cases of fraud would 
have received attention earlier.”127  The 1990 collapse of the Polly Peck International plc 
food and consumer electronics group helped to set the scene.
128
  Some shareholders sought 
shortly before Polly Peck’s downfall to strengthen the company’s board so it would be 
properly situated to deal with Asil Nadir, the company's high-profile chairman, CEO and 
dominant shareholder.
129
  These efforts failed and in October 1990 administrators were called 
in as shares worth £2 billion three months earlier had become worthless and Nadir stood 
accused of having perpetrated what to that point was “the biggest fraud in English 
commercial history.”130   
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The following year -- the year the Cadbury Committee was launched -- was in the 
British business world an “unprecedented year for scandal.”131  In February 1991 criminal 
charges were filed against Nadir, who ultimately fled Britain after being charged with 
stealing over £100m from his company.
132
  In July, global banking authorities, led by the 
Bank of England, shut down the Abu Dhabi dominated Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI) amidst revelations of minimal boardroom oversight of a banking 
business characterized by rampant corruption, deceit and fraud.
133
  Most spectacularly, when 
press baron Robert Maxwell died suddenly in November a business empire orientated around 
two public companies, Maxwell Communications Corporation and Mirror Group Newspapers 
plc, collapsed as improper diversion of pension funds and an illegal share price support 
scheme came to light.
134
  Maxwell was subsequently described as “the greatest and greasiest 
crook in financial history.”135  The non-executive directors of Maxwell Communications and 
Mirror Group Newspapers, which included some prominent former politicians, conferred 
respectability on the Maxwell business empire but seemingly did nothing to deter the 
wrongdoing.
136
  
A Guardian columnist commenting on the release of the Cadbury Committee’s final 
report in 1992 suggested “Mega scandals like BCCI and Maxwell…have rightly propelled the 
issue of corporate governance to the top of the City’s agenda” (“the City” is shorthand for 
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London’s financial district).137  The Maxwell debacle was probably the most crucial.  It 
provided the Cadbury Committee, established a few months beforehand, with a potent 
justification for focusing closely on board responsibility and composition,
138
 topics more in 
the corporate governance mainstream than auditing and accounting.  The scandal also meant 
the Cadbury Committee’s findings captured attention in a manner that would not have 
occurred otherwise.  As the Guardian said of the Committee, “(i)t is reporting at a time when 
public consciousness of wrongdoing in the boardroom is particularly high after the Maxwell 
affair.”139   
Based on the foregoing it might be assumed that the Cadbury Committee’s work, 
fortified by recession, executive pay patterns and corporate scandals, was responsible for 
bringing the concept of corporate governance to prominence in the U.K.  There can be no 
doubt that the Cadbury enterprise was a pivotal chapter in the history of corporate governance 
in Britain.  There were, however, broader forces at work that meant corporate governance 
would have in all likelihood have risen to prominence without Cadbury.   
In 1995 Gina Cole, then secretary to the Cadbury Committee, cited the publication of 
Codes of Conduct by the National Health Service and debates in Canada and Australia 
concerning adoption of “comply or explain” corporate governance arrangements as evidence 
“of the strong influence of the committee’s work.”140  She qualified her verdict, however, 
observing “One cannot say that if the Cadbury Committee had not existed that these 
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developments, and others overseas, would not have occurred.”141  The remainder of the paper 
will argue that the situation was much the same for corporate governance and U.K. public 
companies.  The Cadbury Committee’s legacy was substantial.  After all, the U.K. Corporate 
Governance Code, the successor document to the Cadbury Code of Best Practice – albeit 
much enlarged
142
 – is currently the departure point for understanding corporate governance in 
Britain.  Nevertheless, there was more going on with the rise of corporate governance in the 
U.K. than Cadbury.  Trends that likely would have ensured that corporate governance would 
have become topical in Britain in the early 1990s without Cadbury will be identified in the 
remainder of the paper.  Focusing on developments in the United States provides necessary 
context.   
Corporate Governance “Grows Up” in the U.S.143 
While corporate governance had moved into the spotlight in the U.S. by the late 
1970s, it was unclear what the future held as the 1980s got underway.  The 1970s version of 
“corporate governance”, with nomenclature that implied that the corporation was a political 
structure to be governed, was potentially a poor fit in a decade when faith in markets revived 
and scepticism of government was growing.  A political shift to the right, exemplified by 
Ronald Reagan’s 1980 election to the presidency, took major federal corporate governance 
reform off the table.  The ALI continued with its corporate governance project but, in the face 
of lobbying from the corporate sector and from law school academics examining corporate 
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law from a new, market-oriented “law and economics” perspective, quickly retreated from 
proposals to endorse mandatory rules concerning board structure.   
Corporate governance, however, would not be on the ropes for long.  Interest in the 
topic never entirely flagged in the 1980s and during the 1990s corporate governance became 
well-entrenched in the U.S. as academic, investor and regulatory shorthand.  
Correspondingly, when corporate scandals erupted in a series of major companies in the early 
2000s debates about causes, effects and remedies were routinely framed in terms of 
governance.  A takeover wave the U.S. experienced in the 1980s would help to provide 
corporate governance with staying power, a somewhat ironic twist given that the incentives 
hostile takeover activity provide to management to focus on shareholder interests can render 
internal governance mechanisms superfluous.
144
  Dramatic changes affecting the managerial 
function in U.S. public companies would then in turn provide a potent rationale for corporate 
governance being high on the agenda in the 1990s.   
The 1980s:  Takeovers and Corporate Governance 
A key reason why interest in corporate governance was sustained in the 1980s in the 
U.S. was that it became increasingly associated with shareholder interests.  The shift away 
from the politically-tinged 1970s version of corporate governance matched up well with the 
zeitgeist of the market-friendly 1980s.  For instance, economists who initially shunned 
corporate governance as a mushy irrelevance began treating internal control systems of 
corporations as an important research topic.  A takeover wave the U.S. experienced in the 
1980s played a prominent role in the reorientation of corporate governance around 
shareholders.   
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What became known as “the Deal Decade” was exemplified by bidders relying on 
aggressive, innovative financial and legal techniques to offer generous premiums to 
shareholders of target companies to secure voting control.  The fate of publicly traded 
companies correspondingly hinged to an unprecedented extent on shareholder assessments of 
the capabilities of the incumbent management teams.  Assumptions about the balance of 
power between management and stockholders were accordingly modified in the stockholders’ 
favour and perceptions of corporate governance evolved in turn.   
Takeovers further strengthened the association between corporate governance and 
shareholder interests due to institutional shareholder opposition to defensive tactics 
companies were adopting.  During the 1980s the institutional investors which were 
increasingly displacing retail investors as share owners
145
 generally welcomed the 
opportunity to sell their stock in response to a premium-priced takeover offer.  This set the 
scene for a clash when boards of 1980s public companies began adopting poison pills and 
similar takeover defences to defeat unwelcome takeover bids.   
Various institutional shareholders pushed back against the proliferation of takeover 
defences.  Their struggle was an uphill one but the initial foray would help to set the stage for 
further governance-related activity by institutional investors.  The California Public 
Employees Retirement System (Calpers), a massive public pension fund, was an early and 
vocal objector to the deployment of defensive tactics in the takeover context.  It formalized 
its campaign in 1985 by launching the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an association 
of public pension funds that would subsequently engage in high-profile lobbying for 
shareholder rights. 
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If the same sort of pushback against takeover defences had existed in Britain in the 
1980s this might have resulted in corporate governance achieving prominence earlier than it 
in fact did.  There was, however, no parallel trend in the U.K. despite the surge in takeover 
activity Britain experienced.
146
  The law, in the form of case law rulings and anti-takeover 
statutes a substantial number of states had adopted, gave boards of U.S. public companies 
substantial scope to deploy the defensive tactics to which Calpers and other institutional 
shareholders objected.  The position was considerably different in Britain.
147
  The City Code 
on Take-Overs and Mergers, a body of rules the Bank of England, the London Stock 
Exchange and influential City firms promulgated in the late 1960s to govern bids, precluded a 
public company from taking any “frustrating action” without shareholder consent once a 
takeover offer had materialized.
148
  Various features of U.K. company law and stock market 
regulation also discouraged public companies from embedding takeover defences before a 
bid was on the horizon.
149
  Correspondingly, unlike in the U.S. takeover defences would not 
provide in Britain any sort of catalyst for debate about shareholder rights or corporate 
governance more generally.  
In the U.S. takeovers, in addition to sustaining, if indirectly, corporate governance’s 
relevance in the 1980s by pushing shareholder interests up the agenda, provided a further 
boost when they receded in importance.  The Deal Decade ended abruptly at the beginning of 
the 1990s, due primarily to a nascent recession and a debt market chill.  The widespread 
deployment of defensive tactics meant hostile offers were hit particularly hard.  With the 
disciplinary effects of takeovers having been truncated, attention turned increasingly to the 
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role the board of directors, shareholder activism, incentivized executive compensation and 
related internal governance mechanisms could and should play in keeping managers in check.   
As if on cue, dismissals of CEOs at a number of prominent U.S. public companies in 
the early 1990s indicated that boards were becoming more vigilant.  Institutional shareholders 
simultaneously began lobbying companies to displace a traditional “pay-for-size” bias in 
favour of incentive-oriented remuneration schemes, resulting in a dramatic surge in the use of 
equity-based pay, most prominently in the form of stock options.  The trend increased the 
pay-to-performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration as well as setting the stage for a 
substantial and controversial rise in aggregate levels of managerial compensation during the 
1990s.   
Changes to the Managerial Function 
During the managerialist era immediately following World War II corporate 
governance was not a high priority in the U.S. because amidst general economic prosperity 
egregious misbehaviour was rare among senior executives of public companies.
150
  The 
prototypical executive was a bureaucratically inclined “organization man” who subordinated 
personal aspirations to foster the pursuit of corporate goals.
151
  The paradigmatic chief 
executive aspired to be an industrial statesman who could successfully accommodate a wide 
range of constituencies rather than a charismatic leader taking bold risks.   
The nature of managerial capitalism during the 1950s and 1960s does much to explain 
why when “organization man” was in the ascendancy executives largely stuck to the straight 
and narrow despite neither boards nor shareholders exercising substantial oversight.  Close 
control risk-averse and closely regulated banks exercised over capital-raising and corporate 
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borrowing helped to constrain managerial ambition.  Organized labour was a force to be 
reckoned with in numerous industries and executives frequently agreed to changes that could 
limit significantly their managerial prerogatives so as to promote workplace harmony.  
Though some companies transformed themselves into diversified conglomerates with hectic 
deal-making, a preference in favour of holding a steady course as long as possible was 
prevalent in “first mover” companies which dominated key industries and, correspondingly, 
the U.S. economy.  The “safety-first” bias went largely unchecked by market forces due to a 
dearth of foreign competition and a “managed economy”152 where horizontal mergers 
involving firms with a sizeable market share were strongly discouraged and regulators 
enforced industry-wide standards in telecommunications, transport and other key sectors.   
By the 1990s key precepts of the post-World War II managerialist era had been 
dislodged in a manner that meant U.S. public company executives both had a wider 
opportunity set and greater potential for failure.  Under such circumstances, executive 
performance logically should have been doing more to dictate the fate of the companies they 
ran, which implied the quality of corporate governance should have been a higher priority 
than had previously been the case.  For instance, deregulation, which commenced during the 
late 1970s and moved into full swing in the 1980s, increased the importance of the 
managerial function in firms affected.  This was because the unravelling of constraints on 
horizontal mergers, pricing, marketing and distribution created new opportunities to generate 
profits while the removal of the regulatory “safety net” fostered substantial downside risk for 
laggards. 
Changes in workplace relations in the early 1980s also bolstered the latitude 
executives had.  Due to increasingly robust foreign competition, legal reform and difficult 
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economic times union power drained away.  Correspondingly, while executives in the 
managerialist era had to be mindful of keeping organized labour onside their counterparts in 
the 1990s had wide discretion to respond to technological change and intensified competition 
by outsourcing and downsizing.   
New financial conditions further altered the managerial function.  While during the 
1950 and 1960s commercial and investment banks were conservative allocators of capital by 
the 1990s they were competing intensely for business and public companies could take 
advantage of a wide range of options to finance existing operations, new acquisitions and 
expansion plans.  Improved access to finance could be a curse as well as a blessing for 
executives as seemingly unassailable incumbents increasingly found they were being 
challenged by new entrants that could readily raise capital to play “catch up”.  
The changing circumstances were heralded widely in the 1990s, with books such as 
The Death of Organization Man
153
 and The Transformation of Management
154
 emphasizing 
that “being a CEO ‘ain’t’ what it used to be.”155  Top management of public companies was 
in turn conceptualized differently.  The “imperial” chief executive rose to prominence, with 
the definition of an effective CEO reputedly changing “from that of competent manager to 
charismatic leader.”156   
A consensus developed that under the new conditions chief executives could do more 
to influence corporate performance than used to be the case.  This had significant 
implications for corporate governance.  Having the best possible person in charge logically 
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became a top priority, as did using compensation arrangements to provide executives with 
robust incentives to manage effectively.  The growing emphasis on linking managerial pay 
with performance and the board-led dismissal of CEOs at various prominent U.S. public 
companies in the early 1990s implied there indeed was a meaningful governance response to 
a business environment reshaped by market and regulatory trends.  
Epilogue   
In the 1990s corporate governance increasingly became part of the fabric of corporate 
life in the United States.  This did not mean that corporate governance was functioning 
optimally, as stratospheric executive pay increases in the 1990s and corporate scandals 
afflicting Enron, WorldCom and other prominent public companies in the early 2000s 
demonstrated.  In the wake of the scandals, however, a combination of a tougher legal regime 
(primarily the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)
 157
 and increased vigilance on the part of boards, 
shareholders and the media resulted in a “new, post-revolutionary generation of power in 
corporate America” exemplified by CEOs “on shorter leashes, more beholden to their boards 
of directors.”158  The process was repeated in the banking sector in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis.  Primarily due to tougher regulation by 2013 “Large banks, burned by years 
of scandal, often with swashbuckling CEOs at the helm, (were) turning to new bosses who 
sport well-polished veneers of boringness.”159    
U.S. law professor Ed Rock has characterized today’s public company chief 
executives as “embattled” and has suggested “the central problem of U.S. corporate law for 
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the last eighty years -- the separation of ownership and control -- has largely been solved.”160  
A new series of Enron-style scandals could quickly discredit this rather optimistic 
characterization of governance in the U.S. public company.  Regardless, the foregoing 
account of the history of corporate governance in the U.S. indicates that broad trends 
affecting American public companies ensured that interest in corporate governance would not 
merely be sustained after the 1970s but would grow markedly.  We will see next that similar 
trends were present in the U.K. by the beginning of the 1990s, meaning that corporate 
governance likely was destined to achieve prominence in Britain even without the work done 
by the Cadbury Committee.   
Why Corporate Governance “Fit” Well in Britain in the 1990s 
With corporate governance becoming a global phenomenon as the 1990s drew to a 
close,
161
 it was unlikely to by-pass the U.K. under any circumstances.  Britain, however, was 
not a mere follower with corporate governance.  Instead, the topic came to the forefront in the 
U.K. before it did in other countries, the U.S. excepted.
162
  The Cadbury Committee played a 
significant role in this process but there was more going on.  The chronology of corporate 
governance’s rise in Britain bears out the point.  In 1990, the year before the Cadbury 
Committee was established and Britain was afflicted with its “unprecedented year for 
scandal”,163 press coverage of corporate governance had started in earnest, academic analysis 
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had begun and predictions were being offered that corporate governance would be a key 
1990s theme.
164
    
Why was corporate governance moving up the agenda in Britain and perhaps destined 
for prominence even before the corporate scandals that captured headlines and before the 
establishment of the Cadbury Committee?  The recession Britain was experiencing no doubt 
played a role
165
 but the U.S. experience is also instructive.  Trends that served to sustain 
interest in corporate governance there through the 1980s and prompted a move up the agenda 
in the early 1990s were replicated to a significant degree in Britain.  Correspondingly, it is 
likely that as the 1990s began even in the absence of Cadbury ensuring proper accountability 
of executives was destined to become a higher priority.  Corporate governance in turn would 
have been poised to become a significant feature of debates concerning British public 
companies.   
Takeovers  
One trend relevant to the growing prominence of corporate governance where there 
were parallels between the U.S. and the U.K. concerned takeovers.  In Britain, as in the 
United States, when the hostile takeover activity that was a hallmark of the 1980s ceased 
attention turned increasingly to internal corporate governance mechanisms as a means of 
keeping managers in check.
166
  The Economist, in a 1994 survey of corporate governance, 
provided data showing that since 1990 the flow of hostile bids had dried up in both the U.S. 
and the U.K. and observed “In both countries, the demise of the hostile takeover has removed 
a vital source of contestability from the system of corporate governance.”167  As the 
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Economist argued, the marginalization of takeovers as a governance device created in Britain 
a potential managerial accountability gap other mechanisms, such as board-level monitoring 
and shareholder activism, potentially could and should address.
168
  The fact that M&A 
activity rebounded in the U.K. in the mid-1990s did not change matters.  The deals of this era 
were strategic rather than financial in nature, with bidders seeking to acquire competitors to 
build market share and exploit economies of scale rather than to create value 1980s style by 
displacing underperforming managers.
169
    
Changes to the managerial function 
In the United States the “imperial” CEO of the 1990s replaced the “organization man” 
of the 1950s and 1960s.
170
  An increased emphasis on corporate governance was a logical 
counter-reaction to the trend, with the otherwise high-flying top executives of the 1990s 
being held at least partly in check by a combination of more robust (but still incomplete) 
oversight by boards and shareholders.  Strong parallels can be found in Britain.   
The 1950s and 1960s were something of a “golden age” for British business due to 
buoyant trading conditions and macroeconomic stability fostered by implementation of an 
agenda to manage world trade and finance set down at the Bretton Woods conference in 
1944.
171
  In this benign economic environment increased bureaucratization, career ladders 
and “fitting in” by way of a strong commitment to corporate goals became hallmarks of 
                                                          
168
  ibid., 13-17.  See also Hamish McRae, ‘The Changing Mood of Shareholders’ 
Independent (London, 3 December 1991) 23.   
169
  William Kay, ‘Takeover Fever is Back’, Independent on Sunday (London, 29 January 
1995), Business, 3; Nicholas Denton, ‘Less of an Art and More of an Industry’, Financial 
Times (London, 4 May 1995), International Corporate Finance survey, i.     
170
  Text to n 156. 
171
  Sue Bowden, ‘Corporate Governance in a Political Climate:  The Impact of Public 
Policy Regimes on Corporate Governance in the United Kingdom” in Parkinson, Gamble and 
Kelly (n 61), 175, 177; Alan Dignam and Michael Galanis, The Globalization of Corporate 
Governance (Ashgate, 2009) 97, 222.   
42 
 
management at larger British business enterprises.
172
  The Guardian claimed in 1965 that 
“The era of the rumbustious, larger than life entrepreneur is over.”173  A couple of years later 
a former chief executive of a major food processing company said similarly “The tendency of 
big companies is to produce conformity and the organisation man.”174  One by-product was 
that, as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s in the U.S.,
175
 top executives of leading British 
companies executed their duties faithfully, or least faithfully enough to avoid major scandals.  
While the abrupt 1964 collapse of Rolls Razor, a washing machine retailer, prompted 
amendments to the London Stock Exchange listing rules governing disclosure,
176
 no incident 
occurring during the 1950s and 1960s was sufficiently serious to merit inclusion in a 2000 
Financial Times survey of U.K. financial scandals of the 20
th
 century.
177
  
A couple of decades later the situation was much different.  Amidst an “abrupt” purge 
of managers U.K. companies executed in the 1980s “the promise of corporate loyalty began 
to look an absurd indulgence which preserved incompetents and preserved bureaucracies.”178  
While this created a harsh new reality for many executives, for others the free-wheeling 
1980s provided a welcome boost as entrepreneurial capabilities became increasingly highly 
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valued.  Takeover raiders such as Lord Hanson and Owen Green “were depicted by the media 
as national heroes, liberating companies from their overmanned bureaucracies.”179   
In Britain, as was the case in the U.S., an upgrading of corporate governance 
constituted a logical counter-reaction to the demise of “organization man”, with or without 
Cadbury.  As Anthony Sampson, a well-known “anatomist of Britain”,180 observed in his 
1995 book Company Man:  The Rise and Fall of Corporate Life, “Faced with over-powerful 
bosses, the major investors in Britain and America became more seriously worried about 
what they discreetly called ‘corporate governance.’”181  As early as 1990 U.K. institutional 
shareholders were said to be seeking “to limit the more autocratic type of manager.”182  A 
Guardian columnist said in a 1993 article on the “new culture” in boardrooms “The 
buccaneering entrepreneur is no longer so fashionable.”183  The Financial Times described 
the result: 
“There has been a backlash against the excesses of the 1980s.  Where swashbucklers 
once roamed, audit committees and remuneration committees now have their orderly 
procedures and have to be mollified.”184   
The Sunday Times offered in 1993 a concise chronology of the transition:  “If the 1970s was 
the decade of the establishment corporatists…and the 1980s were the decade of the self-made 
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autocrats, the 1990s is emerging as a decade of low-key but highly professional 
technocrats.”185    
Hanson itself proved the point.  In 1991 it responded to criticism of its corporate 
governance – the term was in regular usage by then – by expanding its tiny contingent of 
non-executive directors.
186
  In 1993 Hanson abandoned plans to amend its articles of 
association to curtail shareholder rights amidst speculation that the company’s business 
model had been compromised because the “raw, unbridled approach of the 80s ha(d) lost its 
respectability.”187  Lord Hanson’s retirement in 1996, which coincided with the break-up of 
the Hanson conglomerate into four parts, was described as “the end of a chapter in the 
evolution of management.”188 
“Parallel changes…to (the) corporate lifestyle” 
It was not merely a coincidence that both Britain and the United States experienced a 
shift from “organization man” to corporate “buccaneers” to which the growing prominence of 
corporate governance was a logical response.  As two guest columnists argued in the Times 
when commenting on the issuance of the May 1992 draft of the Cadbury report, “discussion 
underlying this is similar to that being held in America.  Both countries have seen parallel 
changes and challenges to their corporate lifestyle.”189  Various examples of “parallel 
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changes” can be identified that meant corporate governance likely was destined to rise to 
prominence in the early 1990s as a counter-reaction to changing managerial circumstances in 
U.K. public companies, regardless of Cadbury. 
Deregulation, which in the U.S. increased the importance of the managerial function 
in firms,
190
 was one “parallel change”.  With Britain joining the EEC in 1973, those running 
businesses in the 1980s had to adhere to numerous new EEC-inspired rules.
191
  
Simultaneously, though, various deregulatory initiatives reshaped the British corporate 
landscape.
192
  Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government quickly eliminated exchange 
controls after coming to power in 1979 and subsequently reduced industry subsidies, 
privatized a wide range of nationalized industries, abolished restrictive practices in the 
financial services sector (“Big Bang”) and took a relaxed stance towards foreign companies 
acquiring what had been regarded as implicitly untouchable “flagship” companies.193   
A sharp decline in the bargaining power of unions was another trend that bolstered the 
latitude U.S. executives had as the 20
th
 century drew to a close.
194
  Again, there were strong 
British parallels.  In the decades immediately following World War II, British unions were 
very powerful and employers eager to maintain labour peace did little to contest union-
imposed restrictive practices, which in turn “had a significant effect on the authority, 
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legitimacy and confidence of management.”195  In contrast, in the 1980s, with the 
Conservative government having enacted legislation that restricted the ability of trade unions 
and their members to take industrial action and with union membership falling dramatically 
in the private sector, management “asserted their new-found authority” and “initiated 
offensives against union working practices.”196     
One other “parallel change” relating to the managerial function that set the scene for 
an increased emphasis on corporate governance in Britain was improved access to capital.  In 
the U.S. this trend simultaneously expanded the opportunity set of executives while posing 
challenges by bolstering the firepower of potential rivals.
197
  Yet again the same sort of 
pattern emerged in Britain.  For instance, Hamish McRae and Frances Cairncross, who 
published a book on “the City” in 1971 that they revised and updated on a number of 
occasions, said in the 1991 edition that while in 1971 the most severe criticism of the City 
was that it served British clients poorly, “That is no longer the case.  The 1980s have seen 
radical advances in the variety and qualify of financial services available…to British 
businesses.”198  The available data confirm the point, with U.K. industrial and commercial 
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companies relying in the late 1980s on external sources of finance to an unprecedented 
degree to sustain an investment binge (Fig 4).
199
   
Figure 4:  UK Industrial and Commercial Companies – Sources of Finance, 1979-90 
 
Source:  Data derived from Charkham (1994) (n 191), 297. 
The Maxwell scandal illustrated starkly how improved access to capital could have 
governance implications.  While Maxwell had a chequered business history, securing finance 
was not a problem for him in the years immediately prior to the collapse of his business 
empire, in large measure because in the wake of the mid-1980s deregulation of U.K. financial 
markets bankers eager to stay competitive under more challenging conditions felt compelled 
                                                          
199
  On the “investment binge”, which tailed off during the recession of the early 1990s 
before recovering, see ‘The Wheels of Investment Start to Turn’ Economist (London, 22 
April 1995) 29.  There had been some liberalization of access to credit prior to the late 1980s.  
See Fabbio Braggion and Steven Ongena, ‘A Century of Firm-Bank Relationships’, (2014), 
working paper, available at http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/events/seminar/seminar-
papers/24Apr14.pdf (accessed 17 April 2015), 6 (indicating that with larger companies the 
proportion having borrowing relationships with only one bank as opposed to multiple banks 
fell substantially between 1970 and 1986).  Nevertheless, as Figure 4 shows, there was a 
dramatic expansion of both bank borrowing and “external finance” in the late 1980s.  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1
9
7
9
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
1
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
5
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
7
1
9
8
8
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
0
Non-bank external (£bn)
Bank borrowing
Internal
48 
 
to cut corners or take bigger financial risks.
200
  When the end came for Maxwell companies in 
his poorly governed business empire owed approximately £1.5 billion to banks.
201
   
Enhanced checks and balances 
Given the trends coinciding with the work of the Cadbury Committee that logically 
would have fostered concerns about managerial accountability and given various signs that 
corporate governance was moving higher on the agenda even prior to the launch of 
Cadbury
202
, it seems likely that corporate governance would have risen to prominence in the 
U.K. in the early 1990s even if Cadbury had never happened.  Regardless, however, of the 
exact chain of causation, governance not only was talked about more frequently in this era 
(Fig. 1, Fig. 2) but the monitoring of executives intensified.  Though “(a) certain very British 
reserve…unmistakably remain(ed)”203 institutional shareholders became in the early 1990s 
considerably more willing to take corrective steps publicly in relation to the companies in 
which they owned shares.
204
  This new stance in turn enhanced the leverage of non-executive 
directors, which they proved willing to deploy on various occasions to orchestrate the 
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dismissal of chief executives of prominent public companies.
205
  Pressure also built on 
companies in the early 1990s to link pay with performance, albeit with limited effect.
206
 
The new checks imposed on Britain’s senior executives under the mantle of corporate 
governance affected the culture of the publicly traded company.  In 1995 the Economist 
described Britain’s “new breed of bosses” as “workaholic administrators” who owed their 
elevation to pragmatism rather than vision.
207
  A Guardian columnist observed similarly 
“Cadbury it seems has helped to litter our boardrooms with technocrats, rather than 
swashbuckling entrepreneurs.”208  There indeed were concerns expressed that 1990s Britain 
lacked “business heroes” and that beneficial “animal spirits” were “in short supply”.209  The 
Hampel Committee, in its 1998 report, seemed sympathetic to this line of thinking, saying an 
“emphasis on accountability ha(d) tended to obscure a board’s first responsibility – to 
enhance the prosperity of the business over time.”210  
While during the early 1990s time may have been called on “buccaneers” with “little 
time for the finer points of modern corporate governance”211 checks imposed on executives 
were certainly not robust enough to eliminate concerns about managerial accountability.  
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Executives during the 1990s continued to have in various ways discretion their 1950s and 
1960s counterparts would envy and the “superstar” CEO syndrome that had become 
prevalent in the U.S. took root at least to some degree in Britain, with expectations and 
remuneration to match.
212
  Correspondingly, even in the absence of British versions of Enron 
and WorldCom, amidst ongoing debates concerning board structure and operation, 
newsworthy instances of shareholder activism and recurrent executive pay controversies 
corporate governance would remain a high-profile issue in the U.K.
213
  More scrupulous 
oversight of executives may indeed help to explain why Hanson and BTR-style M&A 
activity never returned – “the City…got a lot better at ousting incompetent management with 
far less drama and cost.”214   
Corporate governance did not entirely extinguish potentially counterproductive 
“animal spirits” in British business.  The imprudent behaviour of various leading banks prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis illustrated the point.
215
  Nevertheless, changes to the managerial 
function did help to ensure that corporate governance would become in the early 1990s an 
integral feature of the public company landscape and would remain so thereafter.  The 
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outcome likely would have been the same even in the absence of the deliberations of the 
Cadbury Committee.    
Conclusion 
British deliberations concerning corporate governance had a substantial impact 
globally, due in large measure to receptivity to the path-breaking work the Cadbury 
Committee did in the early 1990s.
216
  Given the U.K.’s outsized Cadbury-sparked influence, 
it might be thought that Britain was the place where the concept of corporate governance first 
achieved notoriety and that corporate governance was unlikely to have come to prominence 
in the U.K. absent Cadbury.  As this paper has indicated, on both counts the situation was 
quite different.  Corporate governance emerged from linguistic obscurity in the U.S. nearly 
two decades before this occurred in Britain, with a preoccupation with industrial democracy 
in the 1970s and a robust market for corporate control in the 1980s helping to keep corporate 
governance off the agenda in the U.K. until the beginning of the 1990s.  Corporate 
governance in turn likely was destined to rise to prominence in Britain at that point in time – 
Cadbury or no Cadbury -- due to the demise of 1980s-style hostile takeovers and due to 
managerial discretion being enhanced by deregulation, the decline of trade unions and 
liberalized access to capital.   
The underlying trends which meant that corporate governance would have become a 
priority in Britain regardless of Cadbury had strong parallels in the U.S.  What about the rest 
of the world?  By 1998, to quote a report by an OECD corporate governance advisory group, 
corporate governance was a topic “of great international interest and concern.”217  Did the 
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same trends that accounted for corporate governance’s rise to prominence in the U.S. and the 
U.K. explain the rise of corporate governance globally?  This is highly unlikely.   
As the 1998 OECD report acknowledged, corporate governance arrangements differ 
across borders depending on various factors.
218
  Ownership patterns are particularly crucial.  
Whereas in Britain and the U.S. managerial accountability is the top priority because a 
separation of ownership and control is the norm in publicly traded companies,
219
 elsewhere 
dominant shareholders prevail and addressing the potential costs – primarily potential 
exploitation of outside investors -- associated with this type of ownership structure logically 
will be top of the governance agenda.
220
  Given that this paper has focused on managerial 
accountability rather than minority shareholders and has sought to explain the rise of 
corporate governance in the U.S. and the U.K. at least partly by reference to an expansion of 
the opportunity set of executives, the analysis provided here is unlikely to have substantial 
explanatory power with respect to other countries.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
explain why corporate governance ultimately flourished worldwide.  An important 
consideration, however, was that companies in a wide range of countries were seeking capital 
to compete in an increasingly global marketplace and needed to be responsive to concerns 
investors – often U.S.-based – had about proceeding without suitable checks and balances 
being in place.
221
   
While the trends that meant that the rise of corporate governance likely was inevitable 
in Britain in the 1990s even without Cadbury were not international in orientation, the 
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Cadbury Committee’s work did ensure that corporate governance deliberations in the U.K. 
had cross-border ramifications.  Though Britain’s ownership and control arrangements differ 
from those in most other countries, an American academic observed in 1998 that “the process 
by which British businesses have addressed the problems of governance have a singularly 
appealing character.”222  Cadbury, with the promulgation of its novel code of best practice 
and its innovative “comply or explain” enforcement scheme, deserves much of the credit.  As 
a distinguished German corporate governance expert has acknowledged, “Since the Cadbury 
Report in 1992, the corporate governance code movement has swept from the U.K. all over 
the world.”223  Hence, even if corporate governance was destined to come to the U.K. in the 
absence of Cadbury, the impact which deliberations in Britain had globally can be attributed 
primarily to the distinctive brand of corporate governance reform the Cadbury Committee 
pioneered rather than substantially similar corporate governance trends or arrangements.    
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